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Abstract
This paper investigates the cyclicality of bank liquidity creation. Since liquidity creation
is a major economic function of banks, their liquidity creation behavior may amplify
business cycle fluctuations. Using the methodology of Berger and Bouwman (2009) to
compute liquidity creation measures, we analyze the relation between GDP growth and
liquidity creation of Russian banks from 2004 to 2015. Detailed quarterly data on a very
large sample of banks and coexistence of different bank ownership types (state-owned,
domestic private and foreign banks), makes Russia an ideal natural laboratory for study
of cyclicality of liquidity creation for banks. We find that liquidity creation of banks is
procyclical. We show that the liquidity creation behavior of state-owned banks and
foreign-owned banks is similar to that of domestic private banks in terms of
procyclicality. We further find that the magnitude of procyclicality is higher for liquidity
creation than for lending. Thus, while ownership of banks does not influence the
cyclicality of bank liquidity creation, liquidity creation behavior of banks can amplify
business cycle fluctuations.
JEL Codes: G21.
Keywords: bank, liquidity creation, business cycles, state ownership.
1 School of Accounting and Finance, University of Vaasa, P.O. Box 700, FI-65101 Vaasa, Finland. Email:
denis.davydov@uva.fi
2 Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT), Snellmaninaukio, P.O. Box 160, FI-
00101 Helsinki. Email: zuzana.fungacova@bof.fi
3 Corresponding author. Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Université de Strasbourg, 47 avenue de la Forêt Noire,
67082 Strasbourg Cedex. Phone: +33-3-68-85-81-38. Email: laurent.weill@unistra.fr
* We thank Allen Berger, Iikka Korhonen, Sergey Mityakov, Anna Pestova, Alexey Porshakov, Alberto
Pozzolo, Laura Solanko, the participants of the 6 th CInst Banking Workshop (Moscow, October 2016), 14 th
Workshop on Emerging Markets (Madrid, November 2016), 8 th Informal Russia Workshop (Frankfurt,
November 2016), 57th Annual Conference of the Southern Finance Association (Key West, November
2017), 26th International Rome Conference on Money, Banking and Finance (Palermo, December 2017),
the research seminars at the University of Vaasa (October 2016), University of Stockholm (February 2017)
and at the Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition (February 2017) for their valuable
comments and suggestions. Denis Davydov also gratefully acknowledges the financial support from the
Finnish Foundation for Economic Education.
21. Introduction
Liquidity creation is a major function of banks in the economy. Banks create liquidity by
financing relatively illiquid assets with relatively liquid liabilities and thus contribute to
financing the economy and facilitating transactions between economic agents. It is
generally accepted that liquidity creation favors economic growth (e.g. Berger and
Sedunov, 2017; Fidrmuc, Fungá ová and Weill, 2015).
The literature on bank liquidity creation saw a recent boost with the novel approach
proposed by Berger and Bouwman (2009) to measure liquidity created by banks. Several
works build on this approach in examining the determinants of liquidity creation (e.g.
Berger, Bouwman, Kick, and Schaeck, 2016; Fungá ová, Weill, and Zhou, 2017), as well
as the consequences of liquidity creation for financial stability (Berger and Bouwman,
2017; Fungá ová, Turk, and Weill, 2015).
The aim of this paper is to investigate cyclicality of bank liquidity creation. Berger
and Bouwman (2015) point out that bank lending alone is not an optimal measure of bank
output. In order to account for differences in loan categories and composition on the
liability side, one should rather look at the bank liquidity creation. Even as cyclicality of
bank lending has received attention (e.g. Micco and Panizza, 2006; Bertay, Demirgüç-
Kunt, and Huizinga, 2015), no studies to the best of our knowledge consider how bank
core output in the form of liquidity creation reacts to business cycle fluctuations. Given
the key function of banks as liquidity creators, cyclicality of bank liquidity creation might
generate undesirable effects in the economy by amplifying recessions. From a theoretical
perspective, we can expect that liquidity creation is cyclical since liquidity creation
overall increases with greater lending and deposit activities of banks. Since there is
former evidence on cyclicality for lending and since GDP growth is likely to be
positively correlated with deposit growth, the liquidity creation is likely to be cyclical.
However, liquidity creation is a broad measure of bank output taking into account e.g. the
differences between categories of loans. It is therefore necessary to check if empirical
evidence is in line with this expectation.
This study also considers whether liquidity creation by state-owned banks might be
less procyclical than liquidity creation of domestic private banks and foreign banks. Such
3a finding would imply that state-owned banks play a greater role in economic
stabilization than domestic private banks or foreign banks. Bertay, Demirgüc-Kunt and
Huizinga (2015) perform a cross-country analysis to investigate whether cyclicality of
lending differs for state-owned banks relative to private banks and show that lending of
state-owned banks tends to be less procyclical than lending of private banks. Thus, we
ask if this finding holds for the broader notion of liquidity creation as well.
To investigate these issues, we follow the methodology of Berger and Bouwman
(2009) in measuring bank liquidity creation. We classify all bank assets and liabilities
based on their degree of liquidity, then assign weights to each item and compute the
amount of liquidity created by each bank. We consider the Russian banking system for
our analysis and use comprehensive quarterly data from financial reports of the Russian
banks covering the period 2004–2015. The availability of a rich panel dataset on all
Russian banks in terms of level of detail and frequency allows for the measurement of
liquidity creation and for the investigation of business cycle fluctuations. The coexistence
of state-owned, domestic private and foreign banks – especially with each type of bank
controlling significant market shares – makes Russia an ideal natural laboratory for
analyzing how ownership influences cyclicality of bank liquidity creation.
The Russian banking system has largely expanded with a credit to GDP ratio rising
from 22.8% in 2004 to 52.8% in 2015.1 The ratio of bank credit to bank deposits is
110.31% in 2015, meaning that loans are funded by deposits at the aggregate level. The
Russian banking industry includes a very large number of banks even if the number of
banks has massively decreased in the recent years with a fall from 1,299 in 2009 to 733 in
2015 and below 570 in 2017. However the banking market is highly concentrated with
the five largest banks controlling 54.1% of the market in 2015. Largest banks are state-
owned banks. According to Vernikov (2017) for 2015, Russian banking market includes
41 state-owned banks including the largest ones and 61 foreign banks, while all other
institutions are small domestic private banks. It is of interest to stress that state-owned
banks create more liquidity than other banks (Fungacova and Weill, 2012).
This paper contributes to the literature on bank liquidity creation by providing
evidence on its cyclical nature and potential amplifying role in economic recessions. It
1 All figures come from the Central Bank of Russia.
4also relates to the discussion on the economic impact of state ownership of banks. This is
particularly relevant to emerging economies, where banks typically play a major
financing role and the state may be heavily involved in the banking industry.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the related
literature. Section 3 presents data and methodology. Section 4 displays the main
estimations. Section 5 provides additional estimations on cyclicality of bank lending.
Section 6 concludes.
2. Related literature
Our paper relates to two strands of literature. The first deals with bank ownership and
lending behavior, the second with bank liquidity creation.
Regarding the first strand, many studies note the strong association between bank
ownership and lending behavior. Consistent with the political view of state ownership,
some of these studies show that state-owned banks can be exploited by politicians in
ways that drive bank lending to suboptimal levels, especially around electoral periods
(Sapienza, 2004; Dinç, 2005; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Carvalho, 2014; Infante and
Piazza, 2014).
On the other hand, some researchers find, especially after the credit crunch of 2008,
that state ownership of banks can be quite valuable in providing a semblance of economic
stability in times of financial turmoil. State-owned banks can increase their lending
during crises even as foreign banks pull back sharply (Brei and Schclarek, 2013, for a
worldwide sample; Fungá ová, Herrala, and Weill, 2013, for Russia; Albertazzi and
Bottero, 2014, for Italy; De Haas et al., 2015, for Eastern Europe).
Many studies tackle state ownership of banks and its impact on lending (Cull and
Martinez Peria, 2013, for Latin and Eastern Europe; Davydov, 2018, for Russia).
Despite this wide-ranging body of literature, there has been little discussion on how
various types of banks react to business cycle fluctuations. Linking credit and GDP
growth, Micco and Panizza (2006) find that lending by state-owned banks is less cyclical
than lending by privately owned banks on an international sample of banks. Using an
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Huizinga (2015) show that state-owned banks lend countercyclically regardless of
financial crises. While these results are especially strong for developed countries with
good governance, their general conclusion is that state involvement through government
ownership of banks serves as a stabilizing force throughout the business cycle.
Duprey (2015) confirms these findings with bank data from 83 countries over the
period 1990–2010. He documents that privatized banks are associated with increased
lending cyclicality by combining state ownership with individual
privatization/nationalization events.
Behr, Foos, and Norden (2017) examine the effect of government involvement in
banks on cyclicality of lending to small and medium-sized enterprises. Using Germany’s
unique institutional setting, they show that state involvement in a bank reduces the
sensitivity of bank lending to GDP growth. On average, lending by banks with state
involvement is 25% less cyclical than for other types of local banks.
The second strand of literature involves the emerging topic of bank liquidity
creation. A key motivation for the focus on the function of banks as liquidity creators is
the argument from Berger and Bouwman (2015) that bank lending alone is not an optimal
measure of bank output. In order to account for differences in loan categories and
composition on the liability side, one should rather look at the bank liquidity creation
measure suggested by Berger and Bouwman (2009).
Berger and Bouwman (2009) propose an operational procedure to measure bank
liquidity creation. Before their work, we are only aware of one work proposing a measure
of bank liquidity creation: Deep and Schaefer (2004). This paper considers the ratio of
the difference between liquid liabilities and liquid assets scaled by total assets to measure
liquidity creation. It is therefore a very gross measure which does not take into account
the whole classification of assets and liabilities.
Berger and Bouwman (2009) provide a three-step procedure based on the
classification of all bank balance sheet items in terms of liquidity, the assignment of
weights to these items, and the application of a formula. They consequently provide a
comprehensive and operational approach to measure bank liquidity creation which is the
natural measure to adopt in our work on cyclicality of bank liquidity creation.
6They implement their approach on US banks from 1993 to 2003. They find that
liquidity creation in the US has substantially increased during that period. They also
identify several determinants of liquidity creation including large banks and bank
involved in merger activity. Finally, they observe that the relationship between capital
and liquidity creation is positive for large banks but negative for small banks.
Existing empirical literature in the emerging research area of bank liquidity creation
focuses on determinants of bank liquidity creation. Several studies suggest, for example,
that while bank capital tends to be negatively related to liquidity creation, it may depend
on bank size and presence of deposit insurance system (Lei and Song, 2013; Fungá ová,
Weill, and Zhou, 2017). This relationship can even be reversed, implying that greater
liquidity creation increases the probability of bank failure (Fungá ová, Turk, and Weill,
2015). At the same time, liquidity creation by banks may be sensitive to regulatory
interventions and bailouts (Berger et al., 2016) or to monetary policy (Rauch et al., 2011).
For the latter category, the sensitivity may depend on bank size and general economic
conditions (Berger and Bouwman, 2017).
The existing literature suggests that bank ownership may be a major determinant of
bank liquidity creation. Fungá ová and Weill (2012) provide the first investigation of
bank liquidity creation in Russia. They provide measures of liquidity creation for Russian
banks from 1999 to 2009. They show that liquidity creation volume is much lower in
Russia than in the US. However, liquidity creation ratios, which relate liquidity creation
to total assets, are of the same order of magnitude in both countries. Hence, they conclude
that Russian banks are not particularly reluctant to perform their liquidity-creation
functions. They document that large state-owned banks have the greatest impact on
liquidity creation in Russia and also point out that liquidity creation has strongly
increased between 1999 and 2009. Moreover, while on average liquidity creation by
private domestic and foreign banks contracted during the recent financial crisis, state-
owned banks did not reduce their liquidity creation. These results could also indicate
potential countercyclical behavior in liquidity creation by state-controlled banks.
Lei and Song (2013) argue that general negative relation between bank capital and
liquidity creation is irrelevant for foreign banks operating in China. Their findings
underline the importance of type of bank ownership and its impact on liquidity creation.
7Several recent studies show that liquidity creation by banks positively affects
economic growth. Berger and Sedunov (2017) argue that higher levels of bank liquidity
creation are associated with significantly higher GDP in individual US states. Fidrmuc,
Fungá ová, and Weill (2015) document that liquidity creation by banks is positively
related to economic growth in Russian regions (a relationship that held even during the
recent financial crisis).
Overall, these results imply that development of the financial sector may
significantly contribute to economic growth through the bank liquidity creation channel.
3. Data and methodology
3.1 Data description
We employ quarterly bank-level financial statement data for Russian banks from the
Central Bank of Russia (CBR). The period covered is 2004–2015. The dataset contains
detailed information that is necessary for calculation of the bank liquidity creation
measures. We distinguish among corporate, household, and government loans, as well as
types of deposits. Our data also contains detailed information on maturity of various
balance sheet items. Since the data cover all Russian banks, there is no selection bias.
We augment our original dataset with additional data on state ownership of banks
from Vernikov (2017) and define a bank as state-owned if the majority stake in the bank
is held by the federal government, central bank, state-owned enterprises, regional
government, or municipality. We define foreign banks as those where foreign owners
hold more than 50% of the bank’s equity. The data on foreign ownership are obtained
from the CBR, www.allbanks.ru webpage and the banks’ own websites. We also consider
macro-level variables provided by Russia’s Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat).
By excluding non-bank organizations from our sample, we ensure that the data only
include commercial banks. We trim our dependent variables at the 2.5% and 97.5% to
avoid extreme outliers. The final sample consists of unbalanced panel observations on
1,180 individual banks. Depending on the model specification, the number of
8observations varies between 33,099 and 35,349 bank-quarter observations. Descriptive
statistics of the variables used in our analysis are provided in Table 1.
3.2 Liquidity creation measures
Taking Russia-specific factors into account, we construct our bank liquidity creation
measures using the three-step procedure developed by Berger and Bouwman (2009). In
the first step, we classify all bank balance sheet items as liquid, semi-liquid, or illiquid.
This classification is based on the ease, cost, and time necessary for banks (customers) to
turn their obligations into liquid funds (withdraw funds).
Next, we assign weights to all balance sheet items. Following the theory of
financial intermediation, banks are seen to create liquidity by transforming illiquid assets
to liquid liabilities. We thus apply positive weights to these two balance sheet categories.
One unit face value of liquidity is created when a unit of liquid liabilities (e.g. current
account deposits, weighted 0.5) is used to finance a unit of illiquid assets (e.g. corporate
loans, weighted 0.5). We assign negative weights to liquid assets, illiquid liabilities and
capital. One unit of liquidity is destroyed when one unit of illiquid liabilities or equity is
used to finance a unit of liquid assets (e.g. government securities).
Equation (1) presents the functional form used to construct the bank liquidity
creation measures in the third step.
Liquidity Creation = {½ × Illiquid Assets + 0 × Semi-Liquid Assets – ½ × Liquid Assets}
+ {½ × Liquid Liabilities + 0 × Semi-Liquid Liabilities – ½ × Illiquid Liabilities} – ½ ×
Capital (1)
In line with Berger and Bouwman (2009), we construct two measures of liquidity
creation from Equation (1) using two definitions for each of the right-hand-side terms.
The classification of balance sheet items is based on category for the first measure and on
maturity of the individual balance sheet items for the second measure. Table 2 provides a
detailed description of balance sheet items used to calculate these two liquidity creation
measures and the weights assigned to each group.
9Our benchmark liquidity creation measure is based on the classification of
balance sheet items by category. Liquid assets include cash, accounts with banks, and
total securities (stocks, debt securities, and promissory notes). Customer loans are divided
into corporate loans, loans to individuals, and loans to government. Since banks generally
lack the option of selling corporate loans to meet their liquidity needs, such loans are
considered illiquid assets. Other categories of loans, including loans to individuals, loans
to the government and interbank loans, are classified as semi-liquid assets. As mortgage
lending is a recent phenomenon in Russia, most loans to individuals are short-term loans
for buying consumer goods. We treat these loans as semi-liquid, because items with
shorter maturity tend to be more liquid than longer-term items, notwithstanding rare loan
securitization in Russia. The illiquid assets category includes other assets containing e.g.
tangible and intangible assets.
On the liability side, we distinguish between three broad categories: claims of
banks, claims of the non-banking sector, and debt securities issued by banks. Claims of
banks are readily available for withdrawal and fall into the liquid liabilities category. In
contrast, there are two types of claims of the non-banking sector. The first category
includes the settlement accounts of clients (domestic and foreign firms, government, and
households). These are classified as liquid liabilities. Customers can easily withdraw
these funds without penalty. The second category of claims of non-banking sector
contains term deposits classified as semi-liquid liabilities. These may be difficult or
costly to withdraw immediately. The debt securities issued by banks belong either to the
liquid category (promissory notes and bonds) or the semi-liquid category (deposit and
saving certificates). This categorization is based on the liquidity of these instruments in
Russia. The illiquid liabilities category consists of other liabilities that we calculate as the
difference between total liabilities and the sum of all the above-mentioned claims. We
include bank capital here.
The alternative liquidity creation measure that we use in our analysis is based on
the classification of balance sheet items by maturity. To calculate this measure, we
redefine the subgroups of balance sheet items. Liquid assets are defined in the same way
as it was the case for classification by category. Semi-liquid assets consist of various
types of loans with maturity of less than one year. The illiquid assets category contains
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loans with maturity over a year, loans of unknown maturity and other assets (e.g. tangible
and intangible assets). Liquid liabilities include settlement accounts, claims of banks and
debt securities issued (bonds and promissory notes). Semi-liquid liabilities contain all
deposits with maturity less than one year and debt securities issued (deposit and saving
certificates). Illiquid liabilities consist of deposits with maturity of more than a year,
undefined maturity, and other liabilities. As with our benchmark measure of liquidity
creation based on category classification, we treat bank capital as an illiquid balance
sheet item.
In line with Berger and Bouwman (2009), our category-based liquidity creation
measure is the benchmark indicator. While these authors developed the methodologies
for computing both measures, they themselves prefer the category-based measure. In
their view: “What matters to liquidity creation on the asset side is the ease, cost, and time
for banks to dispose of their obligations to obtain liquid funds. The ability to securitize
loans is closer to this concept than the time until self-liquidation.” (Berger and Bouwman,
2009, p. 3797).
We present statistics for the variation in our two main variables - the category-
based liquidity creation measure and credit growth by bank type in Panel B of Table 1.
While the variation in liquidity creation is higher for foreign banks than for domestic
private banks and for state-owned banks, we find that the differences are not statistically
significant. However, credit growth is significantly higher for foreign banks than for the
other two bank types. It is also significantly higher for domestic private banks than for
state-owned banks. In additional tests (not tabulated), we have also investigated if
liquidity creation growth and credit growth were influenced by the global financial crisis.
Both were negatively impacted by the crisis and increased after that without reaching the
pre-crisis levels.
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3.3 Methodology
We begin our empirical analysis of cyclicality of liquidity creation with two-way fixed
effects estimations2. We estimate different specifications of the following model:
, = + + , + , + ,+ + + ,  , (2)
where, ,  is the change in liquidity creation by bank i in quarter t and  is the
change in the macroeconomic indicator for business cycle. We utilize alternatively two
indicators for business cycles. GDP per capita growth is used in the main estimations in
line with earlier papers (e.g., Bertay et al. 2015). We adopt real investment growth in the
robustness check as an alternative indicator. To avoid seasonal fluctuations in the
quarterly liquidity creation and macroeconomic variables, we calculate the change by
dividing quarterly observations in year t by the same quarter in year t-1.
To examine the effect of bank ownership characteristics, we include , , a
vector of dummy variables for state, foreign, and private domestic ownership. We also
include interaction terms of macro variables and ownership dummies to examine the
differential effect of macroeconomic fluctuations on liquidity creation between state-
owned, foreign, and private banks. ,  is a matrix of bank-specific control variables.
Following the related literature on cyclicality of lending (Bertay, Demirgüc-Kunt and
Huizinga, 2015) and on bank liquidity creation (Berger and Bouwman, 2009), we include
lagged values of bank size (log of total assets), the equity-to-assets ratio, the
nonperforming-loans-to-total-loans ratio, and the total-loans-to-total-assets ratio as
control variables.  and  are the bank and time fixed effects. ,  is an error
term.
Our baseline regression model with fixed effects is potentially a subject to
endogeneity problem since we can have reverse causality from growth in liquidity
creation to GDP per capita growth. To tackle this problem and account for the dynamic
2 We perform a Hausman (1978) specification test to identify whether individual-level effects can be
captured in random-effects models. The unreported test clearly rejects the random-effects assumptions and
confirms the choice of fixed-effects estimations as preferred specification.
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properties of our panel, we include a lagged dependent variable to the right-hand-side of
the equation and apply a dynamic two-step system GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover,
1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) using differenced variables as instruments. We assume
that our macroeconomic and ownership variables together with interaction terms are
predetermined, implying that they are not correlated with future error terms. All other
bank-specific controls are considered as endogenous and instrumented with their lags.
This approach leads to a relatively high number of instruments. To avoid an over-
identification problem, we use the collapse option suggested by Roodman (2009) for
bank-specific control variables and limit the number of lags used as other instruments
accordingly. We apply the Windmeijer (2005) correction for standard errors and test for
the autocorrelation in residuals with Arellano-Bond test. We report Hansen test for over-
identifying restrictions where the null hypothesis is that the instruments used are
appropriate.
4. Results
This section presents the results on cyclicality of bank liquidity creation in Russia. We
report the main estimations before testing the sensitivity of the results with robustness
checks.
4.1 Main estimations
Table 3 presents the main estimations. In columns 1 and 2, we report results without
ownership variables. These variables are included in columns 3 and 4. In each case, we
perform estimations alternatively with panel fixed effects and system GMM estimators to
check the sensitivity of our results. Several conclusions emerge.
First, GDP per capita growth enters with positive and significant coefficients in
all regressions. Based on specification 1, we infer that an increase of 1 percentage point
in GDP per capita growth contributes to a 0.711-point increase in bank liquidity creation.
Liquidity creation behavior of banks is thus procyclical, i.e. banks create liquidity in
boom times and reduce liquidity creation during bust times. This finding is important as
13
liquidity creation ostensibly exerts beneficial effects on economic activity (Fidrmuc,
Fungá ová, and Weill, 2015; Berger and Sedunov, 2017). In other words, the liquidity
creation behavior of banks can amplify the business cycle.
Second, the interactions of GDP growth with ownership dummies are not
significant. These results imply the absence of difference in cyclicality of liquidity
creation by bank ownership. In other words, the liquidity creation behavior of state-
owned banks and foreign banks is not different from domestic private banks in terms of
procyclicality. The ownership dummies are also not significant, suggesting no difference
in liquidity creation behavior over the period between different types of ownership.
Our results differ from those observed on cyclicality of bank lending in Bertay
Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2015). First, our results concern liquidity creation, a
broader concept than bank lending. Second, our observations are exclusive to Russia,
while the analysis of Bertay, Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2015) is based on a cross-
country sample of 111 countries. Third, we depart from the conclusion of Fungá ová,
Herrala, and Weill (2013) that foreign banks tend to reduce their credit supply more and
state-owned banks less than domestic private banks in Russia. But again, their findings
consider credit supply in isolation, not liquidity creation – and their study is limited to a
period of financial crisis.
Overall, our findings on the cyclicality of liquidity creation and the role of bank
ownership show a pattern unlike that observed for bank lending alone. They support the
thesis that examining liquidity creation provides additional information for assessing how
bank behavior may amplify business cycles.
We now turn to the analysis of control variables. We observe a negative and
significant sign for equity to assets, suggesting that more capitalized banks have lower
liquidity creation growth. This result is in line with Behr, Foos and Norden (2017) who
find that more capitalized banks have lower loan growth, while Bertay, Demirgüc-Kunt
and Huizinga (2015) obtain no significant link. The ratio of loans to total assets is
significantly positive, indicating that a greater share of loans in the balance sheet is
associated with greater liquidity creation growth. This finding contrasts with the negative
coefficient obtained by Bertay, Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2015) but our study differs
from theirs by focusing on liquidity creation. The share of overdue loans in loans is
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significantly negative, supporting the view that banks with lower quality of their loan
portfolio slow down liquidity creation. Finally, bank size is not significant in most
specifications, suggesting that size does not influence liquidity creation growth.
A natural question emerges if cyclicality of liquidity creation is symmetric for
ownership types. Namely, the findings on cyclicality of liquidity creation by ownership
type can be asymmetric. The average result can be driven by different liquidity creation
behaviors at different stages of the business cycle. For instance, if state-owned banks
create more liquidity in both bust and boom times than domestic private banks, the
average would be that state-owned banks are no more or less procyclical in their behavior
than domestic private banks, i.e. they are more procyclical in boom times and less
procyclical in bust times. Yet there is no doubt that their behavior differs from that of the
domestic private banks with respect to business cycle fluctuations.
To investigate this question, we replace GDP growth by two variables: High GDP
growth and Low GDP growth. Following the approach of Behr et al. (2017), we use the
value of average GDP per capita growth during the sample period to distinguish periods
of high and low growth. In periods of high growth, the High GDP growth variable is
equal to the actual GDP per capita growth if the value is above average, and zero
otherwise. Correspondingly, in periods of low growth, Low GDP Growth is equal to the
actual GDP per capita growth if the value is below average, and zero otherwise. This
approach enables us to investigate if cyclicality in bank liquidity creation is symmetric
through the whole business cycle or asymmetric by only occurring in certain stages of the
business cycle.3 Table 4 reports the estimations.
We observe that estimated coefficient for High GDP growth is significantly
positive, while the coefficient for Low GDP growth is significantly negative. Not
tabulated F-tests indicate that coefficients on High GDP growth and Low GDP growth
are statistically different from zero (F-stat = 24.47) and reject the hypothesis on equality
of these coefficients at the 1% level (F-stat = 43.32). This finding confirms that the
conclusion on procyclical liquidity creation for all banks is observed in both bust and
3 We have also performed estimations for different sub-periods to check whether cyclicality of bank
liquidity creation has changed before and after the global financial crisis. We do not observe any change for
cyclicality concerning the different types of banks and therefore do not report these estimates for the sake
of brevity.
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boom times. Hence, procyclicality of liquidity creation is not driven by a particular stage
of the business cycle. The magnitude of the coefficients for High GDP growth and Low
GDP growth indicates, however, that economic downturns may have a marginally
stronger impact on the change in liquidity creation than upturns. One standard deviation
change in Low GDP growth causes a change in liquidity creation of 0.04, while a similar
change in High GDP growth leads to 0.03-point change.
Interaction terms between ownership dummies and GDP growth are not
significant. Therefore, there is no asymmetry in the cyclicality of liquidity creation for
state-owned banks or foreign banks. These banks do not react any differently to booms or
busts than domestic private banks.
4.2 Robustness checks
While the two estimation approaches (fixed effects and system GMM) applied in the
main estimations already provide a robustness check of our results, we nevertheless
check the robustness of our findings with three additional estimations. First, we use an
alternative measure for liquidity creation. We have used the category-based liquidity
creation measure in our main estimations. We can, however, see if our main findings
remain valid when liquidity creation is measured through classification of balance sheet
items based on maturity rather than category. We repeat our regressions with the
maturity-based liquidity creation measure and report the findings in Table 5.
Our results with the maturity-based liquidity creation measure corroborate the
main findings obtained with the category-based liquidity creation measure. We again
observe a positive coefficient for GDP growth in all regressions. It is significant in three
of the four specifications supporting our conclusion that liquidity creation is procyclical.
We still find no significance for interaction terms between ownership dummies and GDP
growth. This finding confirms that cyclicality of liquidity creation does not differ across
types of banks. To sum up, the estimations with the maturity-based liquidity creation
measure confirm main findings obtained with the category-based liquidity creation
measure.
A different result emerges when it comes to ownership dummy variables. While
they were not significant when the category-based liquidity creation measure was
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considered, we now see positive and significant coefficients for State-owned and Foreign
dummy variables in the system GMM regression. These results support the view that
state-owned banks and foreign banks increased liquidity creation more over the period
than domestic private banks. They are, however, only observed in the system GMM
regression and not confirmed by the panel regression with fixed effects.
Second, we use an alternative indicator for the business cycle. One could argue
that GDP per capita growth does not fully reflect the state of the Russian economy. We
redo our estimations by utilizing real investment growth as the indicator of the business
cycle. Table 6 displays these estimations.
The coefficient for real investment growth is significantly positive, supporting the
finding of procyclical liquidity creation behavior. We again find no difference when
considering the behavior of state-owned and foreign banks. Interaction variables between
ownership dummies and real investment growth are not significant.
 Thus, the estimations with the alternative business cycle indicator confirm our
findings on procyclicality of liquidity creation for all banks, and no differences across
bank ownership types.
Third, we investigate whether the cyclicality of liquidity creation differs with size
of banks. Studies on liquidity creation show significant differences in liquidity creation of
banks depending on size (Berger and Bouwman, 2009). It is therefore of interest to check
if size matters for our main finding of procyclicality of liquidity creation.
We consider three size classes of banks based on their ranking by total assets. Large
banks are the top 50 banks by total assets, medium banks the next 150 banks, and small
banks all others4. Table 7 reports the estimations for each size class. As our previous
estimations have shown that regressions with fixed effects and with system GMM
provide very similar results, we only display the estimations with fixed effects for the
sake of brevity. We find that GDP growth is significantly positive for all size classes,
while interaction terms between GDP growth and ownership dummies are not significant.
Hence, these results corroborate our main findings on procyclicality of liquidity creation
4 This division reflects the structure of the Russian banking sector. Despite a high number of banks, most
are small and only operate at the local or regional level. We get the same results with alternative groupings
that consist of Russia’s top 25 banks, the 100 next-largest banks, and all other banks.
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for all banks, and on the absence of differences in cyclicality for ownership types of
banks.
5. Cyclicality of liquidity creation vs. cyclicality of lending
Our investigation on cyclicality of liquidity creation in the case of Russian banks so far
has established two key findings: 1) the existence of procyclicality of liquidity creation,
and 2) a lack of significant differences among the three bank ownership types with
respect to procyclicality of liquidity creation.
We now ask if these findings are valid for bank lending. Bank liquidity creation is
a broad measure of bank output that includes bank lending, but also other types of assets.
It also takes the liability structure into consideration. Thus, liquidity creation and bank
lending may not necessarily exhibit the same cyclical behavior. Moreover, cyclicality of
ownership types may even differ between bank liquidity creation and bank lending, i.e.
different types of banks may have different behaviors for items other than loans.
We now perform our estimations by considering a new dependent variable: the
growth rate of total loans. This is the same variable that Bertay, Demirgüc-Kunt and
Huizinga (2015) and Behr, Foos and Norden (2017) consider in their analysis of the
cyclicality of bank lending.
Table 8 reports the estimations for cyclicality of bank lending. Again, since
regressions with fixed effects and system GMM provide similar results in the main
estimations, we only display the estimations with fixed effects for the sake of brevity. In
column 1, we consider GDP per capita growth. In column 2, we include the interaction
terms between GDP per capita growth and ownership dummies. In column 3, we consider
the possible asymmetric lending behavior of different types of banks.
First, we observe that bank lending is procyclical with a significantly positive
coefficient for GDP growth in the first two columns. Hence, bank lending is also
procyclical. To assess the magnitude of this procyclicality we compare regressions 1 in
Table 3 (for liquidity creation) and Table 8 (for lending) and observe that one standard
deviation increase in GDP per capita growth causes a 0.08-point increase in bank
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liquidity creation but only a 0.05-point increase in lending. In other words, liquidity
creation is more procyclical than lending. Furthermore, High GDP growth is significantly
positive and Low GDP growth is significantly negative in column 3. These results show
the positive relation between GDP growth and bank lending observed in booms and
busts.
Second, we find evidence for a different pattern for state-owned and foreign
banks compared to domestic private banks. In column 2, the interaction of GDP growth
with Foreign is significantly positive, suggesting that foreign banks have a greater
cyclicality of bank lending than domestic private banks. In column 3, we observe that
Foreign×High GDP growth is significantly positive, while Foreign×Low GDP growth is
not significant. In booms, foreign banks amplify the expansion by increasing bank
lending more than domestic private banks. However they reduce their lending similarly
when the business cycle turns to bust.
Finally, for state-owned banks, we observe no significant coefficient for the
interaction of GDP growth with State-owned in column 2. However, when we examine
the possibility of asymmetric lending behavior in column 3, we find a significantly
positive coefficient for State-owned×Low GDP growth but no significant coefficient for
State-owned×High GDP growth. This suggests that state-owned banks increase their
lending more than domestic private banks during busts, and comports with the view that
the lending behavior of state-owned banks is less procyclical. It also corroborates the
observations of Bertay, Demirgüc-Kunt and Huizinga (2015) at the world level and
Fungá ová, Herrala and Weill (2013) for Russia.
Overall, the estimations for cyclicality of lending show similarities and
differences with those for cyclicality of liquidity creation. We find evidence of
procyclicality for all banks in both sets of estimations, with some differences by
ownership type. For lending only, we find evidence that foreign banks are more
procyclical and state-owned banks less procyclical than domestic private banks.
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6. Conclusions
This study examined cyclicality of bank liquidity creation. While liquidity creation is a
major function of banks in the economy, no paper to date has posed the question of
whether liquidity creation is procyclical and thereby might amplify business cycle
fluctuations. We analyze this question on the Russian banking system by taking into
account potential differences across various bank types. As the literature contains
evidence that lending of state-owned banks may be less cyclical than other banks, we also
check to see if a similar result is observed for liquidity creation.
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, we observe that liquidity
creation of banks is procyclical, i.e. business cycle fluctuations are positively associated
with bank liquidity creation. The magnitude of procyclicality is higher for liquidity
creation than for lending. Second, we show that state-owned banks and foreign banks do
not have a more or less procyclical liquidity creation behavior than domestic private
banks.
These findings have several implications. Liquidity creation behavior of banks
can contribute to amplify business cycle fluctuations since liquidity creation has been
shown to exert beneficial effects on economic activity. Normatively, the evidence is
neutral as to the effects of state ownership of banks. From a research perspective,
however, we see liquidity creation broadens the concept of bank output beyond lending
and offers tantalizing new avenues for further research.
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Table 1.
Descriptive statistics of the main variables
Panel A of this table provides the descriptive statistics for the main variables included in the estimations.
Panel B presents the difference in averages of key variables across bank types. The difference is tested with
t-tests, which are provided in parenthesis. *, **, and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.  All variables follow the Table A1 definitions.
Panel A
N Mean Median SD Min Max
 Liquidity creation (cat) 36 121 0.25 0.13 1.29 -5.08 7.28
 Liquidity creation (mat) 34 219 -0.15 -0.03 1.48 -6.06 4.35
GDP growth 44 227 0.17 0.20 0.11 -0.10 0.36
High GDP growth 44 227 0.15 0.20 0.12 0 0.36
Low GDP growth 44 227 0.01 0.00 0.04 -0.10 0.16
Credit growth 35 152 0.28 0.19 0.47 -0.60 2.63
Real investments growth (RIG) 44 227 0.18 0.18 0.16 -0.14 0.51
Lagged Log(assets) 41 760 14.61 14.49 2.00 6.78 23.84
Lagged Equity/Assets 41 760 0.22 0.17 0.17 -0.68 1.00
Lagged Overdue loans/Loans 40 796 0.03 0.01 0.06 0.00 1.00
Lagged Loans/Assets 41 760 0.57 0.62 0.21 0.00 0.98
State-owned 44 222 0.05 0.00 0.21 0.00 1.00
Foreign 44 222 0.09 0.00 0.29 0.00 1.00
Panel B
Difference in means
State-owned Foreign Private State vs.Private
Foreign
vs. Private
State vs.
Foreign
 Liquidity creation (cat) 0.23 0.28 0.25 -0.01 0.03 -0.05
(0.45) (1.32) (1.21)
Credit growth 0.25 0.29 0.28 -0.03** 0.01* -0.04***
(2.03) (1.40) (2.42)
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Table 2.
Liquidity creation measures
This table classifies all balance sheet items in terms of their liquidity. The weight of each category is given
in parentheses and it is used to calculate two liquidity creation measures following Equation (1). Category
Measure denotes a category-based liquidity creation measure, whereby bank activities are classified based
on various categories. Maturity Measure is a maturity-based liquidity creation measure that is based on
category, maturity classification for interbank loans, and total liabilities.
C
A
TE
G
O
R
Y
M
EA
SU
R
E
Illiquid assets (1/2) Semi-liquid assets (0) Liquid assets (-1/2)
Corporate loans Interbank loans Cash
Other assets Loans to government Correspondent accounts with other
banks
Loans to individuals Total securities (stocks, debt
securities, promissory notes)
Liquid liabilities (1/2) Semi-liquid liabilities (0) Illiquid liabilities and capital(-1/2)
Debt securities issued
(bonds and promissory
notes)
Debt securities issued
(deposit and saving
certificates)
Other liabilities
Claims of non-bank sector:
settlement accounts (firms,
households, government)
Claims of non-bank sector:
term and other deposits
(firms, households,
government)
Capital
Claims of banks
M
A
TU
R
IT
Y
M
EA
SU
R
E
Illiquid assets (1/2) Semi-liquid assets (0) Liquid assets (-1/2)
Corporate loans (maturity
over 1 year)
Corporate loans (maturity
less than 1 year) Cash
Loans to government
(maturity over 1 year)
Loans to government
(maturity less than 1 year)
Correspondent accounts with other
banks
Loans to individuals
(maturity over 1 year)
Loans to individuals
(maturity less than 1 year)
Total securities (stocks, debt
securities, promissory notes)
Loans to banks (maturity
over 1 year)
Loans to banks (maturity less
than 1 year)
Other loans
Other assets
Liquid liabilities (1/2) Semi-liquid liabilities (0) Illiquid liabilities and capital(-1/2)
Debt securities issued
(bonds and promissory
notes)
Debt securities issued
(deposit and saving
certificates)
Deposits (maturity over 1 year and
uncertain term to maturity)
Claims of non-bank sector:
settlement accounts (firms,
households, government)
Deposits
(maturity less than 1 year)
Other liabilities
Claims of banks Capital
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Table 3.
Main estimations
The dependent variable is the growth in liquidity creation based on category. Regression type (OLS with
fixed effects or System GMM) indicated at the top of each column. All variables are defined as in Table
A1. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable =  liquidity creation (CAT)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression type OLS with FE Sys. GMM OLS with FE Sys. GMM
GDP growth 0.711*** 0.571*** 0.719*** 0.505***
(0.16) (0.13) (0.16) (0.15)
Lagged  Liquidity creation
(cat) 0.430*** 0.430***
(0.02) (0.02)
State-owned -0.018 -0.056
(0.13) (0.07)
State-owned x GDP growth 0.230 0.142
(0.28) (0.19)
Foreign -0.066 0.053
(0.15) (0.10)
Foreign x GDP growth -0.253 -0.327
(0.43) (0.29)
Lagged Log(assets) -0.003 -0.089*** -0.002 -0.041
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Lagged Equity/Assets -0.904*** -1.501*** -0.902*** -1.675***
(0.15) (0.32) (0.15) (0.32)
Lagged Overdue Loans/Loans -1.468*** -1.732*** -1.469*** -1.355***
(0.31) (0.43) (0.31) (0.41)
Lagged Loans/Assets 1.154*** 1.441*** 1.157*** 1.503***
(0.11) (0.18) (0.11) (0.19)
Constant -0.045 0.796 -0.059 0.158
(0.45) (0.51) (0.45) (0.58)
No. of obs. 35 349 33 099 35 347 33 097
Adjusted R-squared 0.044 0.044
Number of banks 1 180 1 167 1 180 1 167
Number of instruments 720 740
AR(2) test p-value 0.195 0.206
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.118 0.298
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Table 4.
High and low GDP growth
The dependent variable is the growth in liquidity creation based on category measure. Regression type
(OLS with fixed effects or System GMM) indicated at the top of each column. High and Low GDP growth
are defined using the value of average GDP per capita growth over the full sample period. High (Low)
GDP growth is equal to the actual GDP per capita growth if above (below) the mean, and zero otherwise.
Other variables follow the Table A1 definitions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and ***
denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable =  Liquidity
creation (CAT)
(1) (2)
Regression type OLS with FE Sys. GMM
High GDP growth 0.271** 0.230**
(0.13) (0.11)
Low GDP growth -1.014*** -0.560***
(0.24) (0.22)
Lagged  Liquidity creation (cat) 0.451***
(0.02)
State-owned -0.018 -0.099
(0.12) (0.07)
Foreign -0.080 0.004
(0.15) (0.08)
State-owned x High GDP growth 0.281 0.184
(0.28) (0.18)
State-owned x Low GDP growth -0.062 0.074
(0.69) (0.44)
Foreign x High GDP growth -0.141 -0.232
(0.40) (0.26)
Foreign x Low GDP growth -0.498 -0.504
(0.85) (0.61)
Lagged Log(assets) 0.001 -0.016
(0.03) (0.04)
Lagged Equity/Assets -0.895*** -1.367***
(0.15) (0.33)
Lagged Overdue Loans/Loans -1.447*** -1.463***
(0.31) (0.38)
Lagged Loans/Assets 1.164*** 1.249***
(0.11) (0.19)
Constant 0.021 -0.028
(0.45) (0.55)
No. of obs. 35 347 33 097
Adjusted R-squared 0.045
Number of banks 1 180 1 167
Number of instruments 821
AR(2) test p-value 0.117
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.852
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Table 5.
Alternative liquidity creation measure
The dependent variable is the growth in liquidity creation based on maturity. Regression type (OLS with
fixed effects or System GMM) indicated at the top of each column. All variables follow the Table A1
definitions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an estimate significantly different
from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable =  Liquidity creation (MAT)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression type OLS with FE Sys. GMM OLS with FE Sys. GMM
GDP growth 0.356* 0.226 0.393* 0.441**
(0.20) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20)
Lagged  Liquidity creation
(mat) 0.271*** 0.293***
(0.03) (0.03)
State-owned 0.146 0.210*
(0.14) (0.11)
State-owned x GDP growth 0.195 0.357
(0.43) (0.30)
Foreign 0.080 0.208**
(0.16) (0.09)
Foreign x GDP growth -0.615 -0.450
(0.53) (0.41)
Lagged Log(assets) -0.048 -0.102*** -0.049 -0.111***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Lagged Equity/Assets -0.350** -1.088*** -0.353** -0.804***
(0.16) (0.34) (0.16) (0.30)
Lagged Overdue Loans/Loans 0.096 -0.080 0.081 -0.282
(0.26) (0.38) (0.26) (0.36)
Lagged Loans/Assets 1.281*** 1.662*** 1.284*** 1.578***
(0.11) (0.24) (0.11) (0.25)
Constant -0.018 0.662 -0.014 0.711
(0.50) (0.54) (0.49) (0.62)
No. of obs. 33 442 30 142 33 440 30 140
Adjusted R-squared 0.031 0.031
Number of banks 1 180 1 167 1 180 1 167
Number of instruments 720 740
AR(2) test p-value 0.162 0.261
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.405 0.789
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Table 6.
Alternative indicator of the business cycle
The dependent variable is the growth in liquidity creation based on category measure. Regression type
(OLS with fixed effects or System GMM) indicated at the top of each column. All variables follow the
Table A1 definitions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an estimate significantly
different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable =  Liquidity creation (CAT)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression type OLS with FE Sys. GMM OLS with FE Sys. GMM
Real investments growth (RIG) 0.798*** 0.570*** 0.788*** 0.521***
(0.12) (0.09) (0.12) (0.11)
Lagged  Liquidity creation
(cat) 0.420*** 0.425***
(0.02) (0.02)
State-owned -0.003 -0.057
(0.13) (0.08)
State-owned x RIG 0.147 0.117
(0.21) (0.15)
Foreign -0.111 0.012
(0.15) (0.09)
Foreign x RIG 0.060 -0.039
(0.33) (0.22)
Lagged Log(assets) -0.007 -0.097*** -0.005 -0.044
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Lagged Equity/Assets -0.910*** -1.528*** -0.908*** -1.746***
(0.15) (0.34) (0.15) (0.33)
Lagged Overdue Loans/Loans -1.474*** -1.785*** -1.473*** -1.494***
(0.31) (0.41) (0.31) (0.42)
Lagged Loans/Assets 1.158*** 1.508 1.161*** 1.532***
(0.11) (0.13) (0.11) (0.20)
Constant -0.000 0.872* -0.020 0.198
(0.44) (0.50) (0.45) (0.55)
No. of obs. 35 349 33 099 35 347 33 097
Adjusted R-squared 0.045 0.045
Number of banks 1 180 1 167 1 180 1 167
Number of instruments 720 740
AR(2) test p-value 0.239 0.229
Hansen OIR test p-value 0.158 0.368
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Table 7.
Cyclicality of bank liquidity creation by bank size
The table reports the estimation results for different bank size categories. The dependent variable is the
growth in liquidity creation based on category measure. Columns 1 and 3 are for the largest 50 banks,
Columns 2 and 4 are for the next 150 large banks, and Columns 3 and 6 include all other banks. Regression
type (OLS with fixed effects in all cases here) indicated at the top of each column. All variables follow the
Table A1 definitions. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an estimate significantly
different from 0 at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable =  liquidity creation (CAT)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Regression type
OLS
with FE
OLS with
FE
OLS with
FE
OLS
with FE
OLS with
FE
OLS with
FE
Top 50 Next 150 Rest Top 50 Next 150 Rest
GDP growth 1.016*** 0.728** 0.691*** 0.962* 0.780** 0.708***
(0.343) (0.340) (0.189) (0.519) (0.362) (0.190)
State-owned -0.112 -0.006 0.009
(0.261) (0.241) (0.178)
State-owned x GDP
growth -0.229 0.073 0.313
(0.760) (0.789) (0.333)
Foreign -0.252 0.025 0.120
(0.199) (0.284) (0.235)
Foreign x GDP growth 0.314 -0.361 -0.745
(0.620) (0.605) (0.784)
Lagged Log(assets) -0.196 -0.151* 0.039 -0.196 -0.151* 0.038
(0.119) (0.082) (0.035) (0.120) (0.083) (0.035)
Lagged Equity/Assets -2.775* -1.115 -0.846*** -2.762* -1.109 -0.847***
(1.503) (0.715) (0.157) (1.493) (0.715) (0.158)
Lagged Overdue
Loans/Loans -2.217 -1.807** -1.359*** -2.214 -1.798** -1.371***
(1.646) (0.715) (0.342) (1.600) (0.710) (0.343)
Lagged Loans/Assets 0.574 0.679** 1.226*** 0.629 0.681** 1.226***
(0.604) (0.337) (0.118) (0.655) (0.337) (0.118)
Constant 3.749* 2.687* -0.655 3.780* 2.676* -0.647
(2.192) (1.405) (0.485) (2.235) (1.412) (0.484)
No. of obs. 1 834 5 076 28 439 1 834 5 076 28 437
Adjusted R-squared 0.109 0.067 0.042 0.112 0.068 0.042
Number of banks 50 150 980 50 150 980
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Table 8.
Cyclicality of bank lending
The dependent variable is the growth in bank lending. Regression type (OLS with fixed effects in all cases
here) indicated at the top of each column. All variables follow the definitions in Tables A1 and 4. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote an estimate significantly different from 0 at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent variable =  loans
(1) (2) (3)
Regression type OLS with FE OLS with FE OLS with FE
GDP growth 0.433*** 0.405***
(0.05) (0.05)
High GDP growth 0.162***
(0.04)
Low GDP growth -0.296***
(0.07)
State-owned -0.068 -0.056
(0.07) (0.08)
State-owned x GDP growth 0.165
(0.13)
Foreign -0.106 -0.103
(0.07) (0.06)
Foreign x GDP growth 0.300*
(0.17)
State-owned x High GDP growth 0.177
(0.16)
State-owned x Low GDP growth 0.762*
(0.44)
Foreign x High GDP growth 0.347**
(0.16)
Foreign x Low GDP growth -0.080
(0.30)
Lagged Log(assets) 0.023* 0.025* 0.025*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Lagged Equity/Assets -0.182** -0.182** -0.179**
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Lagged Overdue Loans/Loans -2.277*** -2.267*** -2.258***
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Lagged Loans/Assets 0.202*** 0.203*** 0.205***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Constant -0.023 -0.036 0.016
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
No. of obs. 35 149 35 147 35 147
Adjusted R-squared 0.148 0.149 0.149
Number of banks 1 162 1 162 1 162
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Table A1.
Definition of variables
Variable Definition
 Liquidity creation (cat)
Change in liquidity creation measure based on category
calculated by dividing quarterly observations in year t by the
same quarter in year t-1.
 Liquidity creation (mat)
Change in liquidity creation measure based on maturity
calculated by dividing quarterly observations in year t by the
same quarter in year t-1.
GDP growth Change in GDP per capita by dividing quarterly observations inyear t by the same quarter in year t-1.
Credit growth
Change in net loans to individuals and firms calculated by
dividing quarterly observations in year t by the same quarter in
year t-1.
Real investments growth
(RIG)
Change in real investments calculated by dividing quarterly
observations in year t by the same quarter in year t-1.
Lagged Log(assets) Logarithm of total assets lagged by one quarter.
Lagged Equity/Assets Book value of total-equity-to-total-assets ratio lagged by onequarter.
Lagged Overdue
loans/Loans
Nonperforming loans to total gross total loans lagged by one
quarter.
Lagged Loans/Assets Total-loans-to-total-assets ratio lagged by one quarter.
State-owned
Dummy variable equals one if majority stake of bank’s equity is
owned by the federal government, central bank, state-owned
companies, or regional governments and municipalities, zero
otherwise.
Foreign Dummy variable equals one if foreign ownership corresponds toat least a 50% share, zero otherwise.
High GDP growth Actual GDP per capita growth if above the mean, zero otherwise.
Low GDP growth Actual GDP per capita growth if below the mean, zero otherwise.
